“Cities, like dreams, are made of desires and fears, even if the thread
of their discourse is secret, their rules are absurd, their perspectives
deceitful, and everything conceals something else.” Italo
Calvino (Calvino 1972)
Port Au Prince
Michael
Batty has characterised cities as being complex systems that evolve and
organise themselves, adapting rapidly to various alterations in its fabric. (Batty
2005) With the rapid urbanisation and modernisation of the last century
and the resulting stresses on the environmental, economic, social and
infrastructural capacities of cities, there has been an increase in disasters
and the emergence of new forms of disaster that we have yet to fully conceive (Ramalingam
2012). Here I will look at some of the diverse processes and
contributing factors that produce vulnerability in cities with a focus on Port
Au Prince that led to the devestation (220,000 dead and over 1 million left
homeless) witnessed in Haiti following the earthquake of 12th
January 2010. While the disaster affected the entire country, a very large
number of people and the majority of economic impact were felt in the urban
areas.
There
are issues with choosing Haiti as a case study. As the disaster happened only 4
years ago, there has been little time for humanitarian agencies to reflect
objectively on their actions and for a large body of valid, reliable and
objective material to be published, documenting the data-based results of the
humanitarian response and the impact of programmes. Also, it is recognised that
Haiti is an extreme case that portrays many negative aspects of the urban
fabric. I have attempted to also identify some of the positive aspects of the
city that provided assistance in the emergency response and recovery phases. By
analysing reports from different agencies involved in different sectors of the
response, I have identified some of the typical responses to the disaster in
urban areas and the lessons learned by agencies.
Underlying Causes of Vulnerability
The cost of
urban post-disaster reconstruction can lead to large international debt
reducing options for economic growth and anti-poverty policies, effecting
cities and their inhabitants disproportionately. With repetitive disasters, as
is the case in Haiti, governmental debt can and has led to cuts in food,
education and transportation subsidies and public sector restructuring leads to
higher unemployment and increases in informal employment and a rise in urban
poverty. (Pelling 2003)
Poverty reduction has been slower in urban areas where the identification of
the most vulnerable is more difficult resulting in an ‘urbanisation of
poverty’. The use of poverty lines to identify the most vulnerable has led to a
false reduction in the number of urban poor relative to the rural. National
poverty levels are usually set according to the cost of basic living needs such
as housing, food, education and health but the costs of these commodities are
usually higher in an urban context thus leading to a large number of urban poor
not being categorised as such. (Baker 2008) Prior to the earthquake in 2010, 55% of the population of Port Au
Prince were living on less than 1.25 US$ per day. (IASC 2010b)
The scale of
disasters has increased proportionally with the growth of cities. Of the 20
earthquakes with the highest fatalities, all had high concentrations in urban
areas (Coburn 1989).
However the scale in fatalities cannot be put down to a simple increase in size
and density of cities as cultural, political and socio-economic factors also
play a part in vulnerability. A strong correlation can be seen between poverty
and recent migrants to cities who tend to be excluded and lack the social
integration to access livelihoods and housing. (Pelling 2003)
The growth of slums or the ‘urbanisation of poverty’ is an important factor in
the increase of vulnerability with many slum dwellers struggling to survive in
informal shelter, informal income-generation and lack of access, physically and
socially, to land, education, credit, health, sanitation and markets and are
often located in inadequate housing on land prone to the effects of climate
induced hazards. (Habitat 2003)
Habitants of slums are often isolated from political participation and
representation leading to worsening of the underlying causes of poverty and
vulnerability. A lack of access to credit due to reliance on the informal
economy results in high interest loans being the only
option for mortgages as low-income families are excluded from bank lending reducing
housing entitlements (Pelling
2003) (Westendorff 2004).
86% of people in Port-Au-Prince were living in slum conditions (Committee 2012)
prior to the 2010 earthquake (USGS).
 |
| Figure 1 Inequality, poverty and slum formation (UN Habitat, 2003) |
Low-income
households are unable to invest in renovations and upgrades and governments are
reluctant to invest in infrastructure for areas where land tenure is not
secure. 10 to 15 million families in Latin America live in inadequate housing
with up to 60% of urban populations living in self-built slum housing. (Duncan
2012) With 70% of the
population without access to clean drinking water and 68% without access to
sanitation (IASC 2010b) Port Au Prince grew to become one of the most densely populated
cities in Latin America with nearly all of Haiti’s resources going towards the
consumption of its 2 million people. No regulation of construction created physically
vulnerable areas and further weakened the government. “It was in effect, the
falling of a house of cards,” said Charles Clermont who leads the commission
charged with housing. (IFRC 2010)
Figure 2 Access to
infrastructure (UN Habitat, 2003)
Impacts and response
‘An
assumption made was that working in urban contexts would be easier than working
in rural ones; which in fact was the opposite.’Acting
Country Director, member agency (Carine
Clermont and Spraos 2011)
As is the case in most disasters, the first
responders in Port Au Prince were the communities themselves. The residents of
the city helped each other saving countless lives while the government and
international community mobilised. These communities faced many restraints such
as the failure of electricity, widespread rubble, limited medical skills and
widespread trauma and fear. Although Civil Society Organisations were affected
heavily by the earthquake, they provided valuable immediate assistance. (IASC 2010b)
Urban
populations rely heavily on markets which have the potential to distribute
emergency materials and supplies for reconstruction and food and health items.
If these markets are not functioning there can be a huge delay in the
distribution which can affect all socio-economic levels in post-disaster
recovery. (Brown
2012) Direct impacts are felt in and around a city, interrupting the
flow of goods, services and information which become the root causes of
systemic impacts such as instabilities in political sectors. (Pelling
2003)
Click here to read about the role of public spaces in urban refugee sites.
Click here to read about the role of public spaces in urban refugee sites.
The
response of agencies eroded existing services in Port Au Prince by assuming
that local skills and services were not available. For example water vendors
were not able to compete with free water and building material suppliers were
unable to compete with large scale imports by aid agencies. Some agencies,
notably Christian Aid and Save the Children did work with food vendors for the
distribution of emergency food supplies but these types of responses were too
few. The complex relationships of commerce and competition affected the realistic
capacities of agencies which didn’t reflect the scale of their ambitions.
Several agencies stated that there was no clear exit strategy or indicators of
success established. (Carine
Clermont and Spraos 2011)
In
her book Radical Space, Margaret Kohn (Kohn
2003) outlines the links between physical space and politics through
space’s ability to form individuals’ and groups’ actions, identities and
interpretations. The built environment is also linked symbolically and
pragmatically to institutions of power which, in a disaster situation are
relied upon for coordination due to the complex social systems and high number
of stakeholders in an urban setting. Damage to the built environment can
inhibit the capacities of these government institutions.
Port Au Prince had the advantage of the presence of state bodies
such as the water authority, which played key roles in the provision of certain
services, and many agencies worked through these bodies. (Carine Clermont and Spraos 2011) However, the initial government response was heavily impeded by
the extent of the damage to many official buildings and civil servants. The
National Disaster Risk Management System was severely affected by human and
material loss and the fire station damaged heavily. Many government officials
did not have mobile phones prior to the earthquake which made communication
difficult. Despite all of this, the Emergency Operations Centre (DPC) became
operational the day after the earthquake and began the coordination of
international agencies meeting with representatives twice weekly. (IASC 2010b) The international Search
and Rescue response was highly effective in Port au Prince. Teams from 27 different
countries were operating in 6 groups within 48 hours and rescued 134 people
which is the highest number ever rescued by international SAR teams. (IASC 2010b)
In a DFID report on the humanitarian sector, Paddy Ashdown
describes the response in Haiti as “less than the sum of its parts” with some
1000 NGOs flying into the city. (Ashdown 2011). It has been pointed out that agencies were much more effective
when collaborating. The spatial restrictions of an urban environment call for
the need to coordinate the response with the precision of a city planning
department but this was not the case in Port Au Prince. The presence of
clusters was a positive factor but the sheer number of attendees at cluster
meetings made for ineffective coordination. There was some collaboration with
pre-existing NGOs but it was limited and a more collaborative response may have
led to more sustainable long-term recovery. (Carine Clermont and Spraos 2011). The contradictory report by IASC which reports the effective
coordination of the international humanitarian response illustrates a different
perception to that of the agency reports and may be useful in identifying the
positive actions of some of the government bodies. (IASC 2010b)
The provision of transitional shelters in Port au Prince has been
problematic (Ashdown 2011). This approach has been successful where issues of land ownership
were clear but as is very often the case in Port Au Prince, (prior to the
earthquake only 5% of land was registered), it can result in agencies not
understanding the complexity of the safe return of displaced people, one of the
durable solutions proposed by UN Habitat (Habitat
2007). For example the density of the city led to a scarcity of
land which was further compounded by the 19 million cubic metres of rubble
resulting from the earthquake. (Commission 2011) It has been
suggested that it would be beneficial to appoint an urban settlement specialist
such as UN-Habitat as a member of the core humanitarian coordination team. (IASC 2010b) The difficulties are evident in the one million people still in camps such as Corail in March 2011 (Carine Clermont and Spraos 2011). The focussing of services in camps resulted in a magnetic effect,
drawing more and more people to the camps, increasing numbers. These camps are
generally located outside of the city due to issues with land ownership and
they are remote from services and jobs and there is a large risk of these
becoming future slums. (Fieser 2010)
Findings
In their
extensive analysis of the participation of agencies in Port Au Prince, DEC (Carine Clermont and
Spraos 2011) suggest 10 recommendations for humanitarian actors in urban areas
that came out of the response in Haiti and reflect the general concensus of
most reports. These include working with municipalities and service providers
when possible to strengthen local structures, building social and human capital
at all stages of relief and recovery, not competing with the local private
sector, ensuring the safe return of IDPs to their homes, finding local
professional skills and resources, reconstructing permanent homes rather than
providing temporary shelters, improving the link between analysis and action to
adapt to complex and changing situations, implement cash transfer programmes to
strengthen markets, adapt urban response tools
and incorporate long-term disaster risk reduction strategies in relief
and recovery phases to prepare for future disasters.
It would
appear from many of the reports that while the response was generally quite
successful in that many lives were saved, the recovery period was lacking in
leadership and critical issues relating specifically to an urban environment
were not addressed sufficiently which may lead to an exacerbation of the
previously existing underlying problems such as land tenure, creation of slums,
poverty, insecure living conditions and a lack of spatial considerations in
planning all of which will surely lead to further vulnerability and continue
the cycle of disasters that Haiti has experienced for many years.
Conclusion
There seems to be a lack of expertise in urban studies among
humanitarian agencies illustrated in a lack of insight into the restless,
contradictory and ephemeral nature of cities. Without a deep understanding of
these characteristics, humanitarian agencies will struggle in applying
approaches that try to address the urban as a homogenous system. As Henri
Lefebvre wrote, a good urbanist ‘will come to “listen” to a house, a street, a
town, as an audience listens to a symphony’. (Lefebvre 1992)
In a disaster situation speed and numbers are the
imperative and political and institutional dimensions often conflict with the
humanitarian goals. Damaged infrastructure and buildings not only account for
financial losses but also impair political stability, cultural identity, social
cohesion and livelihood creation that ultimately impede the necessary developmental
approaches necessary for building what has become known as resilience and until
this is addressed, disasters will continue to prevail in the most vulnerable
areas. The difficulty lies in the fact that the appropriate
adaptations may go against the first principles of humanitarian action of
impartiality and neutrality. It will be the task of the humanitarian sector to
find innovative solutions to these issues in the very near future and only when
these practices are mainstreamed into the humanitarian institutional
architecture will agencies become truly effective.
Bibliography
Committee,
D. E. (2012). "HAITI EARTHQUAKE FACTS AND FIGURES." Retrieved 16/03/2014, from http://www.dec.org.uk/haiti-earthquake-facts-and-figures.
United Nations Human
Settlements Programme. Nairobi, Kenya.
USGS. "Earthquakes with 1,000 or More Deaths since 1900."
Retrieved 16/03/2014, from http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/world_deaths.php.
Great work, Martin!
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